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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ROBERT E. SIMMONS, CHARRIE BREN-1
DAVID A. WILLIAMS, LOUIE A.
SHORT, PATRICIA L. CASTILLO, BETH
L. HURST, and JAY EZRA REA,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
11771

STA TE OF UTAH, Department of Public
Safety, Financial Responsibility Division,
Defendant-Appellant.

Reply Brief of Appellant
SCOPE OF REPLY BRIEF
The purpose of this brief is to respond to the
brief by the plaintiffs-respondents. The facts as set
out by the Brief of Appellant are hereby incorporated and made a part of this brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
REPORTS FILED BY THE PARTIES TO THE ACCIDENT AND THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER ARE
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE COM-
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MISSION MAY BASE ITS DECISION TO Sl!SPEND
THE LICENSES OF UNINSURED MOTORISTS.

In the hearings below, an accident report filed
by the investigating officer was relied on by the
Director of the Financial Responsibility Division of
the Department of Public Safety of the State of Utah.
The Director also relied on accident reports filed by
the parties involved in the accident. These reports
are present in every file.
Both of these reports are required by Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-35 (Supp. 1969). The Utah Code aJso provides for the contents to be included in these reports. One of the purposes of these reports is stated
as follows:
"Eve_ry such report shall also contain information sufficient to enable the department
to determine whether the requirements for the
deposit of security under any of the laws of
this state are inapplicable by reason of the existence of insurance or other exceptions specified therein." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-3 7 ( c)
(1960).

It is clear, then, that these Section 41-6-35 reports are
to be used by the Director in making security deposit determinations.

The specific issue involved in this case deals
with the language quoted below:
"The commission shall determine the
amount of security de::posit upon the basis of
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the reports or other evidence submitted to it

but sball not require a deposit of security for
the benefit of any ,'>crson ivben evidence has not
been submittd by s:tcb person or on his behalf
as to tbe extent of l1is injuries or the damage to
his property within fifty (50) days following the

date of the accident . . . . " (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-5(a) (1960).

As has previously been pointed out, the com·
mission has a duty to make some determinations
on the basis of the Section 41-6-35 reports submitted
to it. The commission cannot require a security deposit when neither the injured motorist nor the investigating officer submits evidence as to the extent
of the injuries or property damage.
In each of the cases at the bar, the injured motorist had completed a report spelling out the extent of
'nis injuries or property damc..ge.
One should also riote that the statutory language in Section 41-12-S(a) allows for submission of
reports "on his {secured party's) behalf." This would
include the officer's reports and estimates made by
body shops and personal injury reports fille:-d in by
physicians, which re:oorts are never sought directly
by the department, but only solicited by the parties
to the accident desiring accurate reports to be before the commission.
Since this report c.=in be made "on his behalf,"
there need not be an additional "affirmative act ...
made by an injured oarty to show that he desires
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to invoke the benefits of the act." Brief of Respondents at 9.
The Brief of Respondent interprets the trial
co'Jrt to hold that if one is injured by an uninsured
motorist and the injured person files the required
41-6-35 reports, he would also have to file additional
reports, even though the original 41-6-35 reports coverc::d the full extent of the injuries. It would be more
logical to allow the reports to serve dual functions.
If further injuries such as medical costs or more accurate property damages through estimates are unavJ.ilable within the five days required for reporting, but are subsequently received, they could be
filed as supplementary evidence of damages within the fifty day period required in Section 41-12-5(a),
as amended in 1960.
The only mandate of the statute is the filing of
the Section 41-6-35 reports. If one fails to file these
reports, then he is subject to the following statute:
". . . Any person convicted of failing to
make a report as required herein shall be punished as provided in Section 41-6-164 (misdemeanor)." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-37(d)
(Supp. 1969).

Not only can he be punished for a misdemeanor,
but he loses his rights (after 50 days) of obtaining a
supplemented security deposit from an uninsured
motorist through Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-5(a) (1960).
This is the logical way of reading the clause:
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". . . but it shall not require a deposit of
security for the benefit of any person when evidence has not been submitted by such person
or on his behalf as to the extent of his injuries
or the damage to his property within fifty (50)
days following the date of the accident." Utah
Code Ann.§ 41-12-5(a) (1960).

It should also be kept in mind that the Safety
Responsibility Act is for the public protection, not
just the protection of the injured motorist. This may
be one reason why the statute allows one (such as
the investigating officer) to file reports "on his be-half."

In a recent (and as yet unreported) Utah Supreme Court case, the Court dealt with the same language that is involved in this case. That case dealt
with the problem which bothered Judge Croft and
the respondents--the injustice when there is clear
liability on the part of the injured motorist. The
Court stated:
"We believe the department should consider all of the facts presented to it by way of
accident reports, the reportS of investigating
officers and other evidence submitted to it and
where the evidence would indicate that there is
a lack of culpability on the part of the driver
or drivers, the department should not under
those conditions suspend the operator's license
or the automobile registrations of the person or
persons involved." Hague v. State of Utah, No.
11494, Filed December 5, 1969, at page 2.

%e Hague case requires the commission to use
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a standard, and the standard as suggested in Hague
must be available through the reports before it.
CONCLUSION

Appellant respectfully requires that for the
reasons above stated, the lower court's decision
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
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